Mega-sporting events such as the FIFA World Cup are expensive affairs. Host countries often justify the spending required to stage these events by predicting that mega-events will draw large numbers of tourists. This paper analyzes monthly foreign tourist arrivals into Brazil between 2003 and 2015 and finds that the 2014 FIFA World Cup increased foreign tourism by roughly one million visitors. This number far exceeded expectations, but we show that roughly a quarter of this increase in foreign tourism was caused by the fortuitous advancement of Argentina's national team, and potential hosts should not count on the event to consistently produce out-sized tourism figures We conclude that on-field results can greatly influence FIFA World Cup tourism.
Introduction
Major international sporting events are considered valuable prizes by many countries, and the competition to host these events can be vigorous. In order to justify the costs of hosting, it is often claimed that these events attract large numbers of well-heeled foreign visitors and can be engines of economic growth after the event. The 2014 FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) World Cup is no exception. Leading up to the event, the Brazilian Ministry of Sports forecasted the event would be worth no less than $70 billion and attract 600,000 tourists to Brazil.
1 Such claims were probably necessary to justify the extraordinary expense to host the event. The Brazilian Ministry of Sports reported stadium construction cost $3.6 billion.
2
FIFA concedes that the overall cost of the event was $15 billion, though the organization contributed $2 billion towards operational costs.
3
Unfortunately hosting decisions must be made on ex ante predictions of economic impact, which have a significant amount of variation and can be manipulated by those in favor of hosting. For example, the consulting firm Grant Thornton South Africa initially predicted 483,000 international visitors for the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa. The firm revised their figures downward multiple times, once to "a gross economic impact of $12 billion to the country's economy" with 373,000 international visitors (Voigt, 2011) , and then subsequently placing the economic impact at $7.5 billion along with 198,400 annual jobs (Rihlamvu, 2011) .
Following the event, a report suggested "309,554 foreign tourists arrived in South Africa for the 1 Rapoza, Kenneth, "FIFA World Cup Forecast To Add $70 Billion To Brazil's Economy", Forbes, July 8 2011.
2 Manfred, Tony, "What Brazil's Brand-New $3.6-Billion World Cup Stadiums Look Like", Business Insider, June 9 2014.
primary purpose of attending the 2010 FIFA World Cup" and spent 3.64 billion rand (roughly $500 million using contemporaneous exchange rates) during their stay (FIFA, 2010 people, which is significantly higher than government expectations of 600,000 prior to the event.
Second, we identify a substantial source of variation to any ex ante economic impact prediction of the FIFA World Cup: on-field results. The FIFA World Cup finals begin with 32 teams, each of which is guaranteed three games during the "group stage" of the tournament. The outcomes of the group stage leave 16 teams in the "knockout round", which comprises of single elimination games. In terms of foreign tourism, the best scenario for the host country is that a nearby competitor will advance deep into the knockout round, which will attract its fans to the host results greatly influence the net increase in tourism and therefore the potential economic impact, which means any ex ante prediction of an economic payoff from the FIFA World Cup is subject to a considerable amount of uncertainty completely out of the control of the event organizers.
Impact Analysis
Organizers routinely claim that sporting events have a large impact on host economies through the direct spending of tourists, and the FIFA World Cup is no exception. According to the consulting firm Deloitte, the 2007 Rugby World Cup attracted over 350,000 overseas visitors to France, while the event "can deliver between £260m and £1.1 billion of Gross Value Added to a Host Nation, depending on location" (Deloitte, 2008 Association All-Star Game were as high as 100,000, even though the event was held in arena that has less than 20,000 in capacity (Matheson, 2008) . The National Football League's (NFL) ProBowl has been predicted to attract nearly 50,000 visitors (Baumann and Matheson, 2016) and the NFL Super Bowl typically claims of tourist flows of 100,000 to 125,000 with some predicting that the 2014 game would attract up to 400,000 visitors to the New York City metropolitan area. (Prieto, 2014) Of course, the expenses associated with hosting an event like the FIFA World Cup or the Olympics are quite large, and the majority of these costs are typically borne by the host country. Games (Baade and Matheson, 2016) . The 2010 FIFA World Cup produced $3.9 billion in expenses paid by South Africa, including at least $1.3 billion in stadium construction costs (Voigt, 2010) . As noted previously, Brazil's 2014 FIFA World Cup carried a price tag estimated at $15 billion, including at least $3.6 billion in total spending on 12 new or refurbished stadiums.
Economists are typically skeptical that mega-events can generate sufficient economic benefits to cover the costs of hosting these tournaments (see Matheson, 2016, or Coates and Humphreys, 2008, among others) . First, tourism estimates made prior to the event, especially if they are published by organizations with a vested interest, may be exaggerated in order to increase the amount of public subsidies. Second, if an event draws a primarily local audience, then spending at the event does not represent new money to the economy but rather a reallocation within the local area. Third, not all tourism spending stays in the local economy, particularly for expenditures on goods and services provided by multinational corporations.
These leakages reduce the multiplier effect and thereby decrease the amount of economic impact generated by the event (Matheson, 2009 Summer Olympics compared to the previous year. Utah ski resorts noted a 9.9 percent fall in attendance during the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics and a drop in taxable sales collections at these locations compared to the previous year (Zimbalist, 2015; Baade, Baumann, and Matheson, 2010) . Taxable sales and skier visits rebounded the following season clearly implicating the Olympics in the one-time drop.
While there is a clear relationship, it must be noted that there is not a one to one connection between the number of tourists to an event and the event's economic impact. Often visitors to mega-sporting events are considered to be wealthier than the average tourist. Only the well-heeled, it is thought, can afford the steep ticket prices and costly accommodations that accompany a major event. For example, the average ticket price on secondary markets for Super
Bowl tickets routinely exceed $2,500, and even the cheapest ticket available to foreigners for the 2018 World Cup in Russia is $105. (Seatgeek, 2017; Boehm, 2016) If sports tourists are wealthier, then a major event may cause overall tourism spending to rise even if there is not a net increase in the number of tourists. Heller and Stephenson's (2017) analysis of hotel receipts during mega-events finds that the vast majority of the increase in accommodation revenue during the Super Bowl occurs due to an increase in spending per person rather than an increase in the number of visitors. On the other hand, certain sports teams may have die-hard fans with bigger hearts than wallets. Anecdotally, a large number of Latin American visitors to Brazil during the World Cup spent their time sleeping on beaches rather than in luxury hotels. (Zimbalist, 2015) . If this type of tourist made up a majority of the increase in visitors to the country during the World Cup, a significant increase in tourism may not result in a proportionally large increase in visitor spending. This analysis differentiates arrivals by air and ground in an attempt to address this issue.
Several academic studies have examined tourism inflows and visitor spending at FIFA World Cups. In general, the research finds, at best, modest impacts from hosting. Hagn and Maennig (2008) argue that the 1974 FIFA World Cup in Germany "was not able to generate any medium to long-term employment effects that were significantly different from zero". Baade and Matheson (2004) 
Data
Monthly arrival data by foreigners into Brazil are from Anuário Estatístico, which is administered by the country's Ministério do Turismo. Arrival data are available by land, air, and water and in aggregate, by the country of origin of the traveler. In practice, the number of arrivals by water is very small, so the terms "non-air arrivals" and "land arrivals" may be used roughly interchangeably. These data are available monthly from January 2003 to December 2015.
The quality of any type of economic data is always subject to question especially given the endemic corruption that is known to permeate the Brazilian government. That being said, tourism data has some distinct advantages over other types of economic data that makes it useful for estimating economic impact. Its primary advantage is the ease of collection which likely reduces measurement error. The data simply requires the tabulation of foreigners entering in to the country, and Brazil has a reasonably limited number of entry points. Visitors fill out a simple customs declaration upon arrival and these forms contain all of the information necessary to capture the required data. This is a far easy task than collecting data from either thousands of individual firms or millions of consumers about a wide variety of products. Furthermore, very few business transactions record the national origin of the purchaser making it difficult to disentangle purchases by visitors from those made by locals. Finally, visitor data is not subject to many of the types of underreporting or manipulation that other data sources face. Businesses have a financial incentive to underreport revenues and individuals have the inclination to underreport income in order to avoid taxes. Data collected from visitor surveys is subject to a wide array of biases well known in the literature (see Diamond and Hausman (1994) for a nice discussion). Visitors arriving at an entry point are unable to conceal their presence and generally have little reason or little ability to falsify their national origin. Of course, one can never rule out outright fraud on the part of the government agencies themselves, but among any governmental data source, international arrivals are likely to have among the highest degrees of accuracy, especially in a country that is fairly geographically isolated from most other nations. 
Figure 1: Monthly Arrivals into Brazil; any Country of Origin
Before estimating equation (1), we pause to check whether the data are stationary. We employ the standard tests -augmented Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron, and Kwiatowski-PerronSchmidt-Shin -to test for the presence of a unit root. Because these tests are intended for crosssections of time series data (in our sample, arrivals from one country) and not panels, we present the results for the aggregated data of all international tourism into Brazil over the sample frame.
Though not presented for brevity, the stationary tests for cross-sections of each individual country are largely similar and available upon request. We use the Ng-Perron approach to find the optimal lag structure for these tests. This approach suggests 11 lags in both the all arrivals and air arrivals specifications. The following tests do not contain time trends because they do not substantially change the outcomes. The results are mixed for the dependent variable in levels. In comparison, the first difference of each dependent variable uniformly rejects the presence of a unit root. Table 2 presents these test results. Because the unit root tests have mixed results, we present two estimations of equation (1). Table 3 presents the least squares estimation of equation (1) Though not presented for brevity and available upon request, all estimations include dummy variables for each year and month. Further, countries with national teams in the knockout round brought an additional 13,000 to 17,000 visitors to Brazil, though these estimates are not statistically significant. It is also notable that a large percentage of the July 2014 foreign tourism gains did not arrive by airplane. While foreign net air arrivals during July 2014 are positive, their estimates are smaller and less precise compared to the estimations that analyze all arrivals to Brazil. We also find some evidence of time switching tourism behavior. The summer prior to the 2014 FIFA World Cup had a negative impact on net foreign tourism, though we cannot be certain this was caused by tourists delaying a trip to Brazil for the upcoming 2014 FIFA World Cup. In addition, the summer following the 2014 FIFA World Cup produces a net increase in foreign tourism, which may be caused by the promotional benefits of the event. We conclude that the draw of the home country's national team is a powerful force in FIFA World Cup international tourism, and it is important to note that all but two of the group stage participants (the host country and previous FIFA World Cup champion) are not known at the time when countries bid to host the event.
We now turn to estimations for specific countries-of-origin in order to analyze how exogenous outcomes on the field impact international visitors. Because our estimations now use cross section data, we omit the group stage, knockout round, and fixed effect controls from equation (1) due to perfect collinearity. Each row of Table 4 represents two estimations of equation (1): the first set of estimates uses all arrivals to Brazil while the second set uses only airplane arrivals. Since Anuário Estatístico provides arrival data for 53 countries, equation (1) can be estimated for each country of origin. For brevity, Table 4 only presents estimations for total foreign arrivals into Brazil and a subset of countries whose national team participated in at least the group stage. Estimations for each country of origin are available upon request. Brazil by about one million people over June and July 2014, and a little more than half of which arrived by airplane. The majority of this increase occurs in June, which is also when all 32 teams are still competing.
Of all countries of origin (including those not presented at Table 4 As the results from the unit root testing are somewhat ambiguous, Table 5 estimates uses the first difference of the dependent variable. As with Table 4 , month and year are included in all estimations and only a subset of origin locations are presented but all results are available upon request. The results in Table 5 are largely similar to Table 4 . In this estimation, the total increase in net arrivals is about 973,000 compared to 1.015 million in Table 4 . Argentina remains the largest arrival country, and also the only group of visitors to increase net arrivals in July compared to June. Using these results, we estimate net arrivals in Brazil had Argentina lost to Belgium.
Rather than assuming zero Argentine net arrivals if their national team lost to Belgium, we use its neighbor Uruguay, whose national team was eliminated by a loss in the knockout round to Colombia on June 29, as a guide. Similarly, we use German net arrivals to estimate the increase in Belgian net arrivals had Belgium beat Argentina. The German national team would ultimately win the 2014 FIFA World Cup, and this exercise assumes its participation deep into the knockout round spurred the increase in German net arrivals.
Based on the estimates from Table 4 , July had roughly 38.9 percent of the German net arrivals compared to June. Assuming the same percentage had Belgium advanced further in the tournament, this translates to an increase in net arrivals of about 3,100 Belgians. We use a similar comparison to estimate the loss in net tourism from Argentina had its national team lost Net Arrivals July 2014 (Total = 318,835)
to Belgium. July net arrivals from Uruguay are roughly 4.4 percent of the June estimate.
Assuming the same percentage, we estimate net arrivals from Argentina would be roughly 9,000 had its national team lost. Comparing these outcomes suggests that the impact of Argentina beating Belgium, which only happened by one goal, led to an increase in over 245,000 net arrivals. Given the overall increase in net tourism is roughly one million, this translates to onequarter of the net increase in Brazilian visitors during the 2014 FIFA World Cup. In essence,
Brazil was fortunate that Argentina advanced deep into the tournament as it spurred a substantial amount of its FIFA World Cup tourism. Table 5 summarizes this information. While these comparisons are not perfect, the size of the impact is striking. It is clear from this exercise that a substantial amount of tourism is out of the control of FIFA World Cup planners. While other counterfactuals are possible, such as changing the outcome of a knockout round victory by Colombia over Uruguay, they are small in comparison to Argentina's advancement. We conclude that the uncertainty of on-the-field outcomes introduces a significant amount of statistical noise to any ex ante economic impact estimation.
Conclusions
We estimate that the 2014 FIFA World Cup attracted an additional one million visitors to Brazil over a two-month period. This is a substantial figure considering that the event occurred during the typically low-tourism winter months of Brazil. It is also notable that our estimates exceeded government predictions prior to the event. This is an improvement over the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa, where the net increases in foreign arrivals during the tournament were between one quarter and one half of expectations leading up to the event.
We also identify a source of substantial variation in tourism: on-field results. Our estimates indicate that roughly a quarter of the net increase in tourism occurred because of
